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-rw-r--r--templates/nonce-reuse.html87
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 54 deletions
diff --git a/templates/nonce-reuse.html b/templates/nonce-reuse.html
index e60cc95..94dcb2c 100644
--- a/templates/nonce-reuse.html
+++ b/templates/nonce-reuse.html
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
- <title>Forbidden Salamanders</title>
+ <title>Forbidden Salamanders &middot; Nonce Reuse</title>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/static/styles.css">
@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@
<a href="/git/forbidden-salamanders">source code</a>
<span class="sep"> · </span>
<a href="/forbidden-salamanders/nonce-reuse"><strong>nonce reuse</strong></a>
- <!--
<span class="sep"> · </span>
<a href="/forbidden-salamanders/nonce-truncation">nonce truncation</a>
+ <!--
<span class="sep"> · </span>
<a href="/forbidden-salamanders/key-commitment">key commitment</a>
-->
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
{% endif %}
<form action="/forbidden-salamanders/nonce-reuse" method="post">
<div><em>
- Roseacrucis chooses a key, a nonce, and two messages. He encrypts both messages under the same nonce.
+ Roseacrucis chooses a key, a nonce, and encrypts two messages under the same nonce.
</em></div><br>
<div>
@@ -62,17 +62,19 @@
</div>
<div>
- <label for="m1">First intercepted message</label>
+ <label for="m1">First message</label>
<input name="m1" id="m1" type="text" required maxlength=64 value="{{m1 if m1 else 'The universe (which others call the Library)'}}">
</div>
<div>
- <label for="m2">Second intercepted message</label>
+ <label for="m2">Second message</label>
<input name="m2" id="m2" type="text" required maxlength=64 value="{{m2 if m2 else 'From any of the hexagons one can see, interminably'}}">
</div>
<br><div><em>
- After intercepting the ciphertexts, you choose a new message to forge under the same key and nonce.
+ After intercepting the ciphertexts and recovering the
+ authentication key, you choose a new message to forge under the
+ same key and nonce.
</em></div><br>
<div>
@@ -139,9 +141,10 @@
</p>
<p>
However, we still need to compute a new MAC over the forged ciphertext.
- Simplifying for a ciphertext \(c\) of two blocks, the GMAC MAC is computed as
+ Simplifying for a ciphertext \(c\) of two blocks and no additional
+ authenticated data, the GMAC MAC is computed as
\[
- mac = s + (len)h + c_1h^2 + c_0h^3,
+ mac = s + \vert c\vert h + c_1h^2 + c_0h^3,
\]
where \(s\) is a constant depending on the AES-GCM key and the nonce, and \(h\)
is the authentication key depending only on the AES-GCM key.
@@ -167,6 +170,28 @@
Note that there may be multiple possible monomial roots; in this
case, one can check each possibility against the enemy.
</p>
+ <p>
+ One can use SageMath to compute factors of a polynomial:
+ </p>
+ <pre>
+K = GF(2**128, name='x', modulus=x^128+x^7+x^2+x+1)
+x = K.gen()
+S = PolynomialRing(K, 'y')
+y = S.gen()
+p = (1)*y^4 + (x^7)*y^3 + (x^9 + x^4 + 1)*y^2 + (x^12 + x^2)*y + (x^10 + x^5)
+for factor, _ in p.factor():
+ if factor.degree() == 1:
+ print('Authentication key:', factor - y)</pre>
+ <p>
+ However, the library powering this demonstration implements <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Factorization_of_polynomials_over_finite_fields">polynomial factoring over finite fields</a> from scratch, which is an edifying exercise.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ We present advice for those who wish to implement polynomial factorization as well:
+ </p>
+ <ul>
+ <li>The gcd of two polynomials is unique only up to multiplication by a non-zero constant because &ldquo;greater&rdquo; is defined for polynomials in terms of degree. When used in algorithms, gcd refers to the <em>monic</em> gcd, which is unique.</li>
+ <li>The <a href="https://math.stackexchange.com/a/943626/1084004">inverse Frobenius automorphism</a> (i.e., square root) in \(\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}\) is given by \(\sqrt{x} = x^{2^{127}}\).</li>
+ </ul>
<p>
Readers who wish to implement this attack themselves can try
<a href="https://cryptopals.com/">Cryptopals</a>; specifically
@@ -197,52 +222,6 @@ c_forged, aad_forged = xor(c1, xor(m1, m_forged)), b""
for h, s in possible_secrets:
print("MAC candidate": gmac(h, s, aad_forged, c_forged))</pre></details>
- <details>
- <summary>
- Show me the math.
- </summary>
- <p>
- Once the polynomial difference is computed, one can use SageMath
- to compute the factors:
- </p>
- <pre>
-K = GF(2**128, name='x', modulus=x^128+x^7+x^2+x+1)
-x = K.gen()
-S = PolynomialRing(K, 'y')
-y = S.gen()
-p = (x^127 + x^125 + x^121 + x^118 + x^117 + x^116 + x^113 + x^111 + x^108 + x^105 + x^102 + x^99 + x^97 + x^95 + x^89 + x^87 +
- x^85 + x^84 + x^81 + x^78 + x^73 + x^71 + x^69 + x^67 + x^65 + x^63 + x^62 + x^59 + x^57 + x^55 + x^54 + x^53 + x^52 + x^51 +
-x^49 + x^47 + x^46 + x^45 + x^43 + x^41 + x^39 + x^38 + x^37 + x^36 + x^33 + x^29 + x^28 + x^25 + x^21 + x^20 + x^17 + x^15 + x
-^13 + x^9 + x^7 + x^4 + x^3 + x)*y^5 + (x^127 + x^125 + x^121 + x^118 + x^117 + x^116 + x^113 + x^111 + x^108 + x^105 + x^102 +
- x^99 + x^97 + x^95 + x^89 + x^87 + x^85 + x^84 + x^81 + x^78 + x^73 + x^71 + x^69 + x^67 + x^65 + x^63 + x^62 + x^59 + x^57 +
-x^55 + x^54 + x^53 + x^52 + x^51 + x^49 + x^47 + x^46 + x^45 + x^43 + x^41 + x^39 + x^38 + x^37 + x^36 + x^33 + x^29 + x^28 + x
-^25 + x^21 + x^20 + x^17 + x^15 + x^13 + x^9 + x^7 + x^4 + x^3 + x)*y^4 + (x^127 + x^125 + x^124 + x^123 + x^122 + x^120 + x^11
-9 + x^118 + x^115 + x^112 + x^111 + x^110 + x^109 + x^108 + x^106 + x^101 + x^100 + x^99 + x^98 + x^96 + x^93 + x^88 + x^87 + x
-^84 + x^83 + x^82 + x^78 + x^77 + x^74 + x^71 + x^70 + x^69 + x^68 + x^65 + x^62 + x^61 + x^60 + x^57 + x^55 + x^53 + x^50 + x^
-49 + x^47 + x^46 + x^44 + x^43 + x^41 + x^40 + x^39 + x^37 + x^36 + x^35 + x^34 + x^33 + x^31 + x^30 + x^25 + x^19 + x^16 + x^1
-4 + x^13 + x^12 + x^11 + x^10 + x^5 + x^2 + x + 1)*y^3 + (x^124 + x^123 + x^121 + x^120 + x^119 + x^118 + x^117 + x^116 + x^115
- + x^113 + x^112 + x^110 + x^107 + x^106 + x^104 + x^103 + x^101 + x^99 + x^98 + x^95 + x^94 + x^83 + x^82 + x^81 + x^80 + x^79
- + x^77 + x^76 + x^75 + x^73 + x^72 + x^67 + x^64 + x^63 + x^62 + x^61 + x^59 + x^57 + x^56 + x^54 + x^53 + x^51 + x^49 + x^48
-+ x^46 + x^45 + x^44 + x^42 + x^36 + x^35 + x^34 + x^33 + x^31 + x^28 + x^22 + x^21 + x^17 + x^12 + x^11 + x^10 + x^8 + x^5 + x
-^4 + 1)*y^2 + (x^120 + x^119 + x^56 + x^55)*y + (x^127 + x^126 + x^125 + x^124 + x^123 + x^118 + x^117 + x^116 + x^115 + x^114
-+ x^113 + x^105 + x^103 + x^98 + x^96 + x^94 + x^91 + x^90 + x^89 + x^87 + x^86 + x^85 + x^83 + x^81 + x^80 + x^78 + x^77 + x^7
-0 + x^66 + x^63 + x^62 + x^59 + x^58 + x^54 + x^53 + x^52 + x^50 + x^47 + x^45 + x^44 + x^42 + x^40 + x^39 + x^37 + x^35 + x^34
- + x^30 + x^29 + x^27 + x^26 + x^25 + x^23 + x^18 + x^16 + x^14 + x^13 + x^12 + x^10 + x^9 + x^8 + x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3
-+ 1)
-for factor, _ in p.factor():
- if factor.degree() == 1:
- print('Authentication key:', factor - y)</pre>
- <p>
- However, the library powering this demonstration implements <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Factorization_of_polynomials_over_finite_fields">polynomial factoring over finite fields</a> from scratch, which is an edifying exercise.
- </p>
- <p>
- We present advice for those who wish to implement polynomial factorization as well:
- </p>
- <ul>
- <li>The gcd of two polynomials is unique only up to multiplication by a non-zero constant because &ldquo;greater&rdquo; is defined for polynomials in terms of degree. When used in algorithms, gcd refers to the <em>monic</em> gcd, which is unique.</li>
- <li>The <a href="https://math.stackexchange.com/a/943626/1084004">inverse Frobenius automorphism</a> (i.e., square root) in \(\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}\) is given by \(\sqrt{x} = x^{2^{127}}\).</li>
- </ul>
- </details>
<script>
MathJax = {
tex: {